Maritime Security Market Scope
This chapter addresses maritime markets including, but not limited to, the following sub-markets:

• Seaport security command, control & communication, IT and hardware infrastructure systems.
• Swimmer terror threat mitigation systems.
• Smart container systems.
• RFID container seal systems.
• Container explosives screening systems.
• Security-related renovations and construction projects.
• Seaport perimeter protection systems.
• Nuclear/Radiological container screening systems.
• Deepwater security systems.
• Ship identification systems.
• Maritime security government financed R&D.
• Seaport and ship security systems service and upgrade business.
• Workforce and visitor biometrics identification and surveillance systems…

The Maritime Shipping Industry
The following data illustrates the size and complexity of providing maritime security:

• The global maritime industry traffic entered a deep recession as a result of the latest economic/financial crisis. After years of a solid 5% CAGR growth, this industry is forecasted to experience a few years of decline due to overcapacity of ships and a substantial reduction of shipments resulting in a drop of over 60% in tariffs.
• There are more than 2,000 large ports around the world, from single-berth locations handling a few hundred tons a year to multipurpose facilities handling up to 300 million tons a year.
• Worldwide, there are more than 1,000 major seaports, all will require a substantial security upgrade during the 2009-2018 period.
• More than 80 percent of trade with origins or destinations in developing countries, in tonnage, is waterborne.
• Seaports, from the simple physical sea/land interface they once used to be, have successively turned into commerce and industrial centers, then into logistics and distribution platforms, and are now becoming inter-modal nodes in international supply chain networks, the efficiency of which now drives trade competitiveness.
• About 18 million maritime containers are in use in the world fleet. Given the mix of 20’ and 40’ containers, there are about 24 million total TEUs (Twenty-foot Equivalent Unit). Each container makes, on the average, 12 maritime trips per annum…

Maritime Security Market Background
Containers and other modes of shipment (e.g., bulk goods, oil, LNG) and ships are increasingly targeted by terror and pirate organizations. Exploiting weaknesses in port counter-terror security is central to these terror attacks. The costs associated with the efforts to mitigate against such threats reduce the competitiveness of those affected, including the port; so long as threats to trade exist, port counter-terror security will remain essential to port operations.

A complex transnational set of counter-terror security issues threaten the maritime industry and the movement of cargo in international trade. Those terror threats, including terrorism, smuggling of stowed cargo and piracy, provide an excellent example of the complexity of port counter-terror security issues. Maritime counter-terror security controls include both the waterside and the landside access of ports. Having said that, jurisdictional authority discrepancies, a lack of financial resources, and equipment problems are frustrating the attempts by some countries to address this issue.

Enacting requisite port counter-terror security measures and coordination, cooperation, and communication with governments and maritime industry components are necessary. Solutions require international participation from governments and the global commercial maritime industry. The international trade stake holders and constituents of the world economy, in general, must also become partners in this responsibility…

Chapter TOC
1. Global Maritime Security Market: 2009-2018
1.1. Maritime Security Market Scope
1.2. The Maritime Shipping Industry
1.3. Maritime Security Market Background
1.4. Maritime Security Legislation
1.5. Maritime Security – Business Opportunities and Challenges
1.6. Container Screening Portals Technologies & Markets
1.7. Long Distance Maritime Tracking Technologies & Markets
1.8. Seaport Nuc/Rad Screening Portals Technologies & Markets
1.9. Smart Container Technologies & Markets
1.10. Maritime Security Market Drivers
1.11. Maritime Security Market Inhibitors
1.12. Maritime Security Growth Sub-Markets
1.13. Maritime Security Market Dynamics
1.14. Global Maritime Security Market Outlook: 2009-2018
1.14.1. Global Maritime Security Market Outlook: 2009-2018
1.14.2. The Maritime Security Market by Geographical Region: 2008 & 2018

Now, while the Sirius Star incident is ransom-motivated, it is reasonable to assume that terror organizations around the world watch this new “trend” with interest, and we cannot exclude the worst case scenario - the hijacking of an oil/LNG tanker with for terror purposes.

An international flotilla of ships from American, Russian, Indian, British, and French navies tries to provide some security to oil tankers and other commercial maritime traffic, particularly in front of the (very long) Somalie costline, but these forces are stretched thin across vast areas, and even at the best of times can barely cover only oil choke points such as Bab-El-Mandeb, and the straights of Hormuz and Malacca.

So how do we mitigate against maritime piracy, and even worse so against maritime terrorism?

One of the solutions is to staff each seagoing merchant ships with an on-board armed security crew. This measure, used routinely by the Israeli merchant fleet, is especially desirable for oil and LNG tankers - cargos that can best serve the purposes of terrorists. Such services, provided by multiple private security organizations, cost $20,000 to $50,000 a day. In view of the potential dangers and the high cost of ransoms, and the infinitely higher costs of a successful maritime-borne terror attack, this appears to be a reasonable cost,

However, several factors hinder development of this market segment:

• The notion that armed guards pose more of a risk than a safeguard (e.g., if ships are transporting volatile cargo like oil, a gunshot could lead to a literally explosive situation).
• Host countries do not want to have armed foreigners entering their souvereign territory.

Still, professionals in the LNG industry present a more positive attitude towards such a development, and if the situation does not change significantly for the better soon, others in the maritime and security industries may start changing their mind as well.

What are market opportunities in providing security at high seas:

• The International Maritime Organization’s (IMO) International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) requires AIS (Automatic Identification System) to be fitted aboard international voyaging ships with gross tonnage (GT) of 300 or more tons, and all passenger ships regardless of size. It is estimated that more than 40,000 ships currently carry AIS class A equipment. Still, ship location and tracking capabilities are a far cry from the prevailing equivalent standards in aviation, for example.
• High sea security services, equipment, and crew training.
• Early detection and warning systems, sensors, onboard intrusion alarms and C3I systems.
• Ship-borne means of deterrence and threat mitigation: helicopter, power boats, lethal and non-lethal weapons.

Please consider the following reports for in-depth analysis and forecast of the maritime security market segments:

• Global Homeland Security, Homeland Defense & Intelligence Markets Outlook 2009-2018
• Global LNG (Liquefied Natural Gas) Infrastructure Security Market 2009 - 2014
• Saudi Arabia Homeland Security Market Outlook - 2009-2018
• Saudi Oil Industry Security Market 2009 - 2014

Persistent aerial platforms, or unmanned flight vehicles that will fly above 19km altitude for weeks to years at a time, will revolutionize several industries. Defense professionals will see reductions in both high-flying UAVs and low-flying satellites, with new capabilities to find IED factories and communicate anywhere. Communication professionals will see a large percentage of cell phone service move from ground based towers to aerial vehicles above the jet stream, especially in huge emerging markets like China, India and Africa. Internet professionals will deliver wide-band service from the air. Internet Protocol Television, already the fastest growing entertainment medium, will explode when persistent platforms free customers from all geographic restrictions.

Some current commercial markets will face significant competition. Some air defense systems will be rendered ineffective against surveillance UAVs. New capabilities will emerge that are only dreams today. At least two completely independent teams are funded to fly prototypes in 2009.

A new research report: Persistent High Altitude Platforms & Payloads: Private Industry and Defense Applications Forecast - 2009-2015, led by a veteran near-space professional, describes in detail how we reached the conclusions above, why the market has not evolved as fast as it could and why it will evolve in the near to medium future.

This research is critical to:

• Defense leaders concerned with missile defense, Improvised Explosive Devices, tactical communication, ISR, reducing losses to ambush and attacks on isolated outposts, or Allied disengagement from Iraq.
• Homeland Security leaders concerned with law enforcement, border surveillance, disaster recovery and maritime surveillance.
• Business leaders concerned with the unmanned aerial systems market (either manufacturing or operating) and the satellite market (military or civilian).
• Business leaders concerned with communications (cell phones, portable satellite terminals, hand-held radios), broadcast entertainment (delivered by satellite, radio or cable), aerial photography (Earth imaging, mapping, resource monitoring) and long-haul communications.
• First Responders concerned with communication and sensor data during and after disasters.

20-Country National Security Outlay [$Billion]: 2008 & 2018

The Report concludes that on the backdrop of the global economic crisis, the national security spending (the cumulative national defense, intelligence, homeland security and internal security spending) will remain recession-proof in all the 20 countries reported.
Furthermore, the new study concludes, among other

• Several countries like China ,India Saudi Arabia Indonesia and Turkey driven by internal and external security challenges, are forecasted to double their national security spending over the 2008-2018 period.
• Most other countries’ national security spending growth rate will be linked to their GDP growth.
• In spite of the wall street meltdown, the U.S. will spend 38-40% of the world’s national security spending.

Colorado Springs, CO (November,1st, 2008) - An imminent technology and market research report by Homeland Security Research Corp, with lead analyst Edward Herlik, concludes that several significant commercial markets will be transformed by new flight vehicles. Recent developments in extremely long endurance robotic flight will create or impact opportunities in entertainment broadcasting, cell phone service, overhead imagery, etc. Much of this profit will shift away from the space service industry.

The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency or DARPA, the US military’s future-focused engineering developer, finished initial development and evaluation of stratospheric airships. DARPA declared them ready for large scale prototyping in 2007. DARPA then began similar work on traditional unmanned aerial vehicles or UAVs with a goal to reach the same prototyping decision point in 2012. One such UAV, the British civil and government partnership QinetiQ’s Zephyr, flew up to 60,000’ for three and a half days at the end of July 2008. A Southwest Research Institute team has flown a small airship above 70,000’ twice, though for far less time due to tears in the fabric.

Two American firms have funding to fly prototype stratospheric airships around September 2009. Those competing efforts use entirely different technologies and are intended for entirely different markets. Other relevant flights have already occurred in South Korea, Japan and Switzerland. Those efforts are aimed squarely at commercial markets, though the military potential is also obvious.

These and other recent developments indicate, according to HSRC’s analysis, the initial probability for truly persistent high altitude platforms. Those unmanned flight vehicles will fly into the wind in the lower stratosphere to essentially hover over one area. They will behave like geosynchronous satellites but will be much cheaper and easily upgradeable. This cost-effectiveness, together with the new technology’s ability to stay on location for weeks to years at a time, is the key to their commercial value. Such capabilities will cost a tenth or less of space service costs with significant savings over conventional aircraft and cell phone towers as well.

Cell phone markets in developed regions like North America, Europe and Northeastern Asia are saturated. Customers have as many accounts as they like and will soon reduce the numbers of subscriptions as coverage expands. Why? There’s little need to carry multiple cell phones while traveling or to reach other limited accounts if one service will do it all. This trend means that increased profits in developed markets will only come from added premium services, such as broadband data, or enticing customers away from competitors. Persistent platforms will enable that competition with payloads that can be easily upgraded to 4G and future formats while delivering uninterrupted service over very wide areas.

Developing areas of Africa, Asia and India are adding cell phone subscribers at over 50% per year in some cases. That pattern mirrors the 65% growth rate in cell service seen industrialized areas during the 1990s. But, growth is severely hampered by the lack of infrastructure. Persistent platforms will deliver cell service from above 60,000’ and allow providers to skip the cell tower stage entirely. This may be the only way to exploit those markets profitably.

Cell Phone Infrastructure spending must grow rapidly to serve new markets in developing areas and to introduce new services in Europe, North America, Japan and South Korea.

There are significant profits to be made in both providing the aerial infrastructure and in providing the cell service itself. In vast areas where customer density is too thin or their subscriptions too small to support traditional infrastructure, persistent platforms will be the only means to deliver profitable service. Those flight vehicles, airships at first, will also lease payload space for other services such as imagery and wireless internet.

Persistent platforms provide solutions to problems that are not yet solved by space services. Three foot resolution, for example, is uncommon and expensive from satellites in typical 250 mile orbits. Such satellites rarely pass over a specific point on the ground and must get lucky with sun angle, weather and other potential obstacles to produce images that are useful to customers such as Google Earth and Microsoft’s Virtual Earth. Persistent platforms, on the other hand, flying above the jet stream will move where they’re needed and deliver streaming video at less than one foot resolution, on demand. Those robot flight vehicles, unlike space vehicles, can be recovered for upgrade and reuse.

Satellite television is the space industry’s most profitable commercial venture. Persistent platforms will, in our opinion, provide stiff competition in major markets by delivering cheaper high definition service to ordinary antennas. This competition may also force the unprofitable satellite radio industry into bankruptcy.

The new UAVs will also contribute to the creation of new markets that are not now possible. Internet Protocol Television (IPTV), which is already delivered as part of very high-speed internet capabilities, is the most obvious early beneficiary. IPTV works by delivering broadcast and on-demand television over internet connections in essentially the same way that satellite television delivers content over specialized ground hardware. Both services are difficult or impossible to receive when moving or when away from their specialized hardware.

Persistent platforms will change all that by connecting customers with high data rate service through built-in antennas or laptop computer communications cards. Even at fixed locations, we forecast that IPTV will expand faster than any other entertainment service.

About HSRC
Homeland Security Research Corp. (HSRC) is a Washington, DC based, international market research and professional services firm serving the homeland security market. Our firm provides premium market, technology and industry expertise that enable clients around the world gain critical insight into the business opportunities that exist within the Homeland Security market. Our clients include U.S., European and other governments, Fortune 500 companies and homeland security planners worldwide.

*About Ed Herlik
Ed Herlik recently retired from a long US Air Force career. He earned a Bachelor of Science in Engineering and International Affairs from the US Air Force Academy and a Master of Arts in National Security Studies from California State University. A Cold War, Desert Storm, Somalia and the Balkans veteran, Ed was a command pilot with operational experience in attack, transport and helicopter aircraft and well as commercial jets. He also served two tours in the US Air Force Space Command, finishing as the command’s expert on the survivability of persistent platforms. He has two patents (firefighting aircraft and stress sensing bolts) with two more pending (stratospheric airships and hybrid engines for used vehicles). Ed also authored the book, “Separated by War: An Oral History by Desert Storm Fliers and their Families” (McGraw-Hill)

Despite the feeling that we live in a predominantly technological society, and that consequently technology drives society (and of course decision making within societies) many crucial decisions that lead to the adoption of certain technologies, and to our adaptation to certain technologies, are not based purely on technology, but much more on internal politics, social and psychological variables. This is very much the case with respect to interoperable communications, a seemingly technological exercise, that actually tries to bring together sometimes wildly differing organizational, even national cultures. An examination of the global interoperability landscape shows that many decisions leading to the evolution of this area have little to do with pure technology and economy, but much to do with local, social, political and in many cases psychological processes.

It turns out that communications interoperability is primarily a cultural phenomenon, and only secondarily a technological one. The lack of “intuitive” interoperability If that is the case, it stands to reason that in the quest for good communications interoperability we will pay attention to cultural, psychological, sociological and political aspects no less, and maybe even more than the attention given to the specific technologies that offer themselves as “solutions”.

Not surprisingly, it is possible to show that psychology and economic considerations, drive many choices of technological solutions, without allowing proportional reflection on specific technologies’ functional and/or economic superiority. Rather, these decisions reflect balance-of-power realities at the time the choices were made (e.g., a dominant professional group within a region dictates a pattern of technological adoption that reflects its own perception and experience, rather than an overall consideration of the needs of the greater whole; or a large corporation developing a technology, and leveraging it into the marketplace in a way that does not necessarily reflects its functional, cultural and/or economic superiority).

In fact, communications interoperability has much to do with traditional negotiations and dispute resolution, as it has to do with technology. The success or failures in this area, worldwide, reflect the ability of various groups to negotiate cross-functional, cross-organizational, and even cross-cultural cooperation and collaboration agreements in a way that highlights the common (and in most cases, compromised) interest, as opposed to the individual (or in this case, the uni-organizational) perspective.

What can be done to increase the chances that evolving interoperable communications reflect more the needs of the whole and less the power of the few?

1) Involve non-partisan expertise in the evolution and determination of standards.

2) Bring negotiations and dispute resolution “mediators” into the discussions between functional organizations (e.g., different first responders), in an attempt to help better identify common needs, interests and threads).

3) Integrate organizational culture experts into the earliest stages of an interoperability experiment, in an attempt to identify and if possible deal with potentially show-stopping organizational differences.

4) Try to analyze, recognize and integrate an understanding of the limits and limitations of technologies, to avoid attempts to “force” a technological solution on a human infrastructure that is unable or unwilling to adopt it and/or adapt to it.

Since we are talking about investments of billions of dollars, years of efforts and ultimately the ability to bring all this to bear in the service of saving lives, it makes sense to pay attention to the non-technological aspects of communications interoperability. Doing so may increase the chance of our getting it right the first time, and that is something that I am sure we can all agree on.

Colorado Springs, CO (November 1st, 2008) - Air Force resistance to change has delayed the deployment of “backtracking” capabilities, or the ability to play a video traffic record in reverse to find bomb factories, weapons caches, safe houses, etc. This is one of the conclusions of an upcoming Persistent High Altitude Arial Platform Technologies and Markets Forecast research report by Homeland Security Research Corporation (HSRC) and Edward Herlik.

Additionally, the report concludes that US military ground forces have not yet deployed “virtual team member” capabilities despite the fact that it was possible as early as summer, 2006, denying ground forces the potential protection and additional intelligence they so need.

These capabilities are only possible given breakthroughs in lighter-than-air stratospheric airship technology. The US, Japan, South Korea and Switzerland have active airship programs with prototype flights logged between 15,000 and 73,000 feet. Russia and even Indonesia have study and design programs. DARPA, the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, completed initial work on such technology in 2007, declaring stratospheric airships ready for large-scale prototyping. That agency has recently begun the same effort on heavier-than-air flight vehicles with a prototyping decision scheduled for 2012 and possible flight soon after.

Whether floating or flying, those aerial vehicles are designed to persist above the jet stream for weeks to years at a time. They are designed to point into the wind and fly at its speed to essentially hover over one point on the ground. Operationally, they’ll perform like very low altitude geosynchronous satellites. The ability to remain within sight of a chosen area 24/7 has been called the Holy Grail of surveillance and also enables significant communications possibilities.

Virtual Team Member refers to the ability to deploy a trained soldier/operator with a patrolling squad or other unit, using persistent platforms to enable the virtual team member to view the entire battle through sensors on a persistent aerial platform. In other words, a unit member may watch over the patrol preventing ambushes, calling in supporting fire, coordinating aircraft, etc.

Recent battles in Afghanistan have been fought without ever sighting the insurgents in that very rough terrain. Virtual Team Members would use gunfire-detection technology to pinpoint attackers and then direct fires or air strikes.

In this figure, we can see a Virtual Team Member stationed at the headquarters on the left (X) “patrolling” with the unit in the field by operating the airship’s sensors (shown in blue) and communicating through the flight vehicle’s communication relays. Those relays would also connect all patrol members to each other and to anyone in the world.

Backtracking is only one of several capabilities enabled by truly persistent surveillance. The term is used commonly by the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization, a Department of Defense office that spends approximately $4 billion annually on near-term capabilities. Creating an unbroken video record of all ground movement enables intelligence operators to start with an event (bomb detonation or discovery) and follow the device backward through time to its point of origin. Bomb makers would have to move outside the surveillance area to avoid that outcome, exposing them to more checkpoints and other operational risks. Adding persistent platforms would push the surveillance limits outward.

US counter-IED forces list the ability to observe traffic without gaps so as to play the record in reverse after an explosion as one of their top priorities. With backtracking, bomb makers would be exposed to the risks they now pass off on suicide bombers.

Former Air Force Chief of Staff General John Jumper directed Air Force Space Command to develop persistent platforms starting in 2003. That work would have resulted in prototype capabilities during 2006 but was cancelled by Space Command when Jumper retired. The fixed-wing program was transferred to Air Combat Command. Stratospheric airship development has no current Air Force sponsor. The Army’s Space and Missile Defense Command is attempting airship development and has just received prototype funding from an Air Force headquarters unit. A civilian prototype effort is also funded. Both prototypes should fly around September, 2009.

The upcoming commercial and defense market forecast report also details the potentially significant disruption to space service providers as direct broadcast television, satellite radio and imagery customers move to persistent platforms. The report lays out the potential impact of such technologies on the booming cellular telephone markets in Asia, Africa and India.

About HSRC
Homeland Security Research Corp. (HSRC) is a Washington, DC based, international market research and professional services firm serving the homeland security market. Our firm provides premium market, technology and industry expertise that enable clients around the world gain critical insight into the business opportunities that exist within the Homeland Security market. Our clients include U.S., European and other governments, Fortune 500 companies and homeland security planners worldwide.

*About Ed Herlik
Ed Herlik recently retired from a long US Air Force career. He earned a Bachelor of Science in Engineering and International Affairs from the US Air Force Academy and a Master of Arts in National Security Studies from California State University. A Cold War, Desert Storm, Somalia and the Balkans veteran, Ed was a command pilot with operational experience in attack, transport and helicopter aircraft and well as commercial jets. He also served two tours in the US Air Force Space Command, finishing as the command’s expert on the survivability of persistent platforms. He has two patents (firefighting aircraft and stress sensing bolts) with two more pending (stratospheric airships and hybrid engines for used vehicles). Ed also authored the book, “Separated by War: An Oral History by Desert Storm Fliers and their Families” (McGraw-Hill)

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Flying a relatively inexpensive Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) over one area for months to years at a time has been called the “Holy Grail” of both commercial and military markets. Well, the persistent future is here – technologies exist to prototype initial defense and commercial lighter-than-air capabilities, with fixed-wing UASs capabilities coming soon thereafter.

This new in-depth report includes detailed analysis of today’s persistent market, its inhibitors, drivers, and opportunities, combined with penetrating technical examination of both flight platforms and payloads.

This report is designed specifically to inform business and technology decision makers about this market’s significant potential. It details which technologies are ready, who can build them, US & foreign competition, coming market disruptions & which markets will be most profitable to 2015 and beyond.

The new report covers a wide spectrum of upcoming military and private industry business opportunities in areas such as:

• Counter IED
• Missile Defense
• Tactical Communications in Urban and Mountainous areas
• Commercial Communications such as Cell Phone and Internet
• Mobile Internet Protocol Television
• Border Protection and Maritime Patrol
• First Responders Communication and Surveillance Support
• Satellite Radio without the Satellites
• Google Earth-type Imagery on demand
• And many more

The report’s Table of Content is available for preview here.

Table of Contents
1. Administration
1.1. Why Persistent Platforms?
1.2. The Market for Persistent Platforms
1.3. Scope of this Report
1.4. Basic Assumptions
1.5. Methodology
1.5.1. Research Team and Methods
1.6. Who Is This Report For?
1.6.1. Business and Civilian Government Leaders
1.6.2. Military Leaders
1.6.3. Persistent Aerial Platform Professionals
1.6.4. Payload Professionals and Market Analysts
1.7. About the Lead Analyst

2. Executive Summary
2.1. The Problem
2.2. The Solution
2.3. What is a Persistent Aerial Platform?
2.3.1. Heavier vs. Lighter-than-Air in the Stratosphere
2.4. Major Findings
2.4.1. Summary
2.4.2. Detailed Findings
2.5. Major Conclusions
2.5.1. Flight Vehicles
2.5.2. Culture
2.5.3. Commercial Issues
2.5.4. X-Prize?

3. Development Drivers
3.1. Triple-Use Systems
3.2. Unique Capability
3.3. Effective at Reduced Cost
3.4. Controllable, Dedicated, Specialized
3.5. Cost Effectiveness
3.6. Excellent Counter-Terror Tool
3.7. Reduces Number of People at Risk
3.8. Recognized Military Value
3.9. Next Big Commercial Aviation Market

4. Development Inhibitors
4.1. Commercial Competition (Mostly from Space)
4.2. Cultural “Pushback”
4.3. Airspace Restrictions
4.4. Radio Frequency Interference
4.5. Technical Challenges
4.6. US Government Budget Process

5. Business Opportunities
5.1. Early Adoption Profit Opportunities
5.1.1. Permanent Communications Relay Services
5.1.2. Direct Broadcast Entertainment (both Television and Radio)
5.1.3. High-Speed Internet Connections
5.1.4. Regional Earth Observation - Overhead Imagery
5.1.5. Traffic Monitoring
5.1.6. Gas-Oil Pipeline and Power Grid Control
5.1.7. Contamination and Environmental Monitoring
5.1.8. Natural Disaster Monitoring
5.1.9. Agricultural Optimization
5.1.10. Infrastructure Monitoring
5.1.11. Border and Maritime Control
5.2. Market Potential
5.2.1. Space Capability Market Share
5.3. National Security Market Opportunities
5.3.1. Tactical Beyond Line of Sight Communication on the Move
5.3.2. Wideband Reachback & Dedicated Strategic Communication
5.3.3. Persistent ISR & Red Force Tracking
5.3.4. Change Detection for Mines & IEDs
5.3.5. Blue Force Tracking
5.3.6. Battlespace Awareness
5.3.7. Foliage-Penetrating ISR
5.3.8. Signals Detection & Characterization
5.3.9. All Weather Imaging
5.3.10. Detonation/IR Detection & Characterization
5.3.11. Psychological Operations (PSYOPS)
5.3.12. Fleeting Target Strike
5.4. Aircraft and UAV Market Share Losses

6. Vendor and User Attitudes
6.1. Platform Vendor Attitudes
6.2. Payload Vendor Attitudes
6.3. User Attitudes
6.3.1. Military/Government Customer Attitudes
6.3.2. Commercial Customer Attitudes
6.3.3. Build it and They Will Come

7. Technical Potential
7.1. Heavier-Than-Air: Technology Challenges
7.2. Lighter-Than-Air - Technology Challenges
7.3. Potential Field of Regard/View
7.3.1. Sample United States Coverage from the Stratosphere
7.4. Flight Vehicle Survivability
7.4.1.
7.4.2. Fixed Wing
7.4.3. Lighter-Than-Air
7.5. Payload Survivability

8. Satellites vs. Persistent Platforms
8.1. Similarities
8.2. Differences
8.3. Complementary Features
8.4. Cost
8.5. US Military
8.5.1. Space Community Culture
8.5.2. Culture Matters
8.5.3. Culture-Driven Sales Realities
8.5.4. Market Share Losses

9. Existing Technologies
9.1. Satellites
9.2. Aircraft
9.3. Balloons

10. Near-Space Flight Environment
10.1. Environment Summary
10.2. Environmental Challenges
10.3. Where to Fly?
10.3.1. Wind & Jet Stream
10.3.2. Regulation

11. The Case Against “Traditional” UAVs
11.1. Why Not Just Fly More UAVs?
11.1.1. Traditional UAV Limitations
11.1.2. Persistent Platform Advantages

12. Likely Operating Concept
12.1. Platform vs. Payload
12.2. Orbit or Operating Area
12.3. Payload Operation
12.4. Illustrations
12.5. Sample Missions/Services
12.5.1. Virtual Team Member
12.5.2. Backtracking
12.5.3. Commercial Imagery
12.5.4. Cell Phone Service

13. Emerging Technologies
13.1. Flight Vehicle Summary
13.1.1. Fixed-Wing
13.1.2. Lighter-Than-Air
13.2. Inherent Problems
13.2.1. Fixed-Wing
13.2.2. Lighter-Than-Air
13.3. Development History
13.3.1. Fixed Wing
13.3.2. Lighter-Than-Air
13.3.3. US Fixed-Wing Development Sponsors
13.3.4. US Lighter-Than-Air Development Sponsors
13.4. Persistent Fixed-Wing Unmanned Aerial Systems (UASs)
13.4.1. UAS Platforms
13.4.2. UAS Payloads
13.4.3. Potential UAS Vendors
13.5. Persistent Lighter-Than-Air (LTA) Airships
13.5.1. Misperception
13.5.2. LTA Platforms
13.5.3. LTA Payloads
13.5.4. Potential LTA Vendors

14. Market Forecast by Missions
14.1. Basic Market Realities
14.2. Forecast
14.3. Commercial Missions Market Forecast
14.3.1. Satellite Telephone, Telecommunications & Cellular Telephone
14.3.2. Entertainment
14.3.3. Earth Sensing
14.3.4. Imaging & Mapping
14.3.5. Weather Forecasting & Earth Observation
14.3.6. Pollution Monitoring
14.3.7. Air Traffic Control
14.3.8. Earth Observation
14.4. Military Missions – Market Forecast
14.4.1. Market Shift Causes & Results
14.4.2. Shifting Military Missions
14.4.3. UAS Priorities
14.4.4. Relevant Defense Spending
14.4.5. “Peace Dividends”
14.4.6. Funding Forecasts
14.4.7. Forecasted Profitable Market Areas
14.5. Homeland Security and Law Enforcement
14.5.1. Relevant UAS Capabilities
14.5.2. Land Border Surveillance
14.5.3. Coastal Security
14.5.4. Law Enforcement
14.5.5. First Responders and Disaster Recovery
14.5.6. Search and Rescue
14.5.7. Wildland Fire Suppression
14.5.8. Special Event and Area Protection
14.5.9. Tracking & Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID)
14.5.10. Natural Disaster Prevention, Mitigation and Recovery

15. Forecast by Technology
15.1. Platform Technologies
15.1.1. Fixed-Wing UASs
15.1.2. Airships
15.2. Forecast by Payload
15.2.1. US Remote Sensing Policy
15.2.2. Cellular Telephone Transceivers (Cell Phones)
15.2.3. Direct Broadcast Radio and Television
15.2.4. Optical Sensors
15.2.5. Radar
15.2.6. Lidar: Laser ‘Radar’
15.2.7. SIGINT & Electronic Warfare Systems
15.2.8. Anti-Ballistic Missile Weapons

16. Overview by Nation/Region
16.1. Canada
16.2. China
16.3. Europe
16.4. Germany
16.5. Israel
16.6. Japan
16.7. Russia
16.8. Saudi Arabia (and other rich, threatened governments)
16.9. South Korea
16.10. Switzerland
16.11. United Kingdom
16.12. United States

17. Glossary

List of Tables
Table 1 - US Government Persistent Platform Market Share Forecast [%] – 2009–2015
Table 2 - Satellite Entertainment Service Revenue by [$Billion] – 2009–2015
Table 3 - NDIA Study – Platform and Payload Combinations
Table 4 - African Cell Phone Demand – Forecasted Customers [Millions of Subscribers]
– 2009-2015
Table 5 - Civil Space Budget by Nation by [$Million] for FY 2006-2007
Table 6 - US Government Space – Forecasted Spending by [$Billion] – 2009–2015
Table 7 - US UAS Acquisition Budget Forecast by [$Million] – 2009–2015
Table 8 - US UAS Operations & Maintenance Budget Forecast by [$Million] – 2009–2015
Table 9 - Payload Coverage Diameter [Km] at Various Look-Up or Elevation Angles
Table 10 - Payload Coverage Diameter [km] at Various Elevation Angles - Look-Up or
Elevation Angle
Table 11 - Potential Early Private and Homeland Security Markets – 2009-2015
Table 12 - Forecasted Worldwide Cell Phone Subscriptions [Millions of Subscribers] – 2009–2015
Table 13 - Forecasted Cell Phone Subscribers by Region by [Millions of Subscribers] – 2009-2015
Table 14 - Forecasted Cell Phone Infrastructure Spending [$Billion] – 2009-2015
Table 15 - National Defense Industry Association - Potential Near-Space Missions
Table 16 - DoD Prioritized UAS Needs – FY2002
Table 17 - DoD Prioritized UAS Needs – FY2007
Table 18 - US War on Terror Spending by [$Million] – 2001–2009
Table 19 - US Army Sensor Budget Forecast by [$Million] – 2007 – 2013
Table 20 - US Military Fixed-Wing UAS – Forecasted Market [$Million] – 2009-2015
Table 21 - US Military Persistent Platform – Forecasted Market by [$Million] – 2009–2015
Table 22 - Counter IED – Forecasted Markets by Function [$Million] – 2009-2015
Table 23 - Counter IED – Forecasted Markets [%] – 2009-2015
Table 24 - US Missile Defense Agency – Forecasted Budget [$Million] – 2009-2015
Table 25 - US Homeland Security Requirements
Table 26 - Tracking Mission (RFID) – Forecasted Market [$Million] – 2009-2015
Table 27 - European Cell Customers Forecast – Low-Speed vs. High-Speed [Millions of Subscribers] – 2009-2015
Table 28 - US Cell Customers Forecast – Low-Speed vs. High-Speed by [Millions of
Subscribers] – 2009-2015
Table 29 - Estimated Populations in 2000 and 2030 [Millions]
Table 30 - African Cell Customers Forecast – Low-Speed vs. High-Speed [Millions of
Subscribers] – 2009-2015
Table 31 - Chinese Cell Customers Forecast – Low-Speed vs. High-Speed [Millions of
Subscribers] – 2009-2015
Table 32 - Indian Cell Customers Forecast – Low-Speed vs. High-Speed [Millions of
Subscribers] – 2009-2015
Table 33 - Direct Broadcast Entertainment – Forecasted Market [$Billion] – 2009-2015
Table 34 - US Remote Sensing – Forecasted Market [$Million] – 2009-2015

List of Figures
Figure 1 - US Government Persistent Platform Market Share Forecast by [%] – 2009–
2015
Figure 2 - Internet Protocol Television (IPTV) Revenue (left) & US Unmanned Aerial
Systems (right) Spending [$Billion] – 2009–2015
Figure 3 - Satellite Entertainment Service Revenue by [$Billion] – 2009–2015
Figure 4 - Developing Nations’ Cell Phone Demand [Millions of Subscribers] by Countryin 2006
Figure 5 - Developing Nations’ Cell Phone Demand Growth Rate by [%] by Country in 2006
Figure 6 - Worldwide Cell Phone Subscriptions Outlook – 2015
Figure 7 - US Counter IED Spending in 2015 by [$Million]
Figure 8 - African Cell Phone Demand – Forecasted Customers [Millions of Subscribers]– 2009–2015
Figure 9 - Civil Space Budget by Nation by [$Million] for FY 2006-2007
Figure 10 - US Government Space – Forecasted Spending by [$Billion] – 2009–2015
Figure 11 - US UAS Acquisition Budget Forecast by [$Billion] – 2009–2015
Figure 12 - US UAS Operations & Maintenance Budget Forecast by [$Million] – 2009–2015
Figure 13 - SwRI’s HiSentinel50 Airship in 2008
Figure 14 - Payload Coverage Diameter at 20km Attitude (New York City Area)
Figure 15 - Full Continental US Radio Coverage Possible From Aerial Vehicles at 20km
with Five Degree Look-Up Angle
Figure 16 - Partial Continental US Radio Coverage Possible From Aerial Vehicles at
20km with Five Degree Look-Up Angle
Figure 17 - The Response Time of a Symmetrical Constellation of Remote Sensing Satellites
Figure 18 - Space Data Corporation Balloon with Controller
Figure 19 - Space Data Corporation Altitude Control Valve Assembly
Figure 20 - Typical January US Jet Stream
Figure 21 - Typical July US Jet Stream
Figure 22 - Average Wind Velocities over the US
Figure 23 - Payload Coverage Diameter at 20km Attitude (Baghdad, Iraq Area)
Figure 24 - Capability Owner Determines Vehicle’s Responsiveness to Various Users by Programming a Payload Controller
Figure 25 - Field of Regard (large) vs. Camera Field of View (small)
Figure 26 - Several Cameras May Operate Independently
Figure 27 - Radio Footprint Extends Across a Very Large Diameter
Figure 28 - Sample Airship Profiles at Low Reynolds Numbers
Figure 29 - Artist’s Conception of Global Observer on Station in the Stratosphere
Figure 30 - QinetiQ’s Zephyr UAV
Figure 31 - Boeing & QinetiQ Vulture Concept Flying Wing
Figure 32 - Lockheed-Martin Vulture Concept
Figure 33 - Photon Sieve
Figure 34 - Nickel Photon Sieve Operating with Simulated Starlight
Figure 35- Corner Cube Mounted in Metal Frame
Figure 36 - Artist’s Conception of LMCO High Altitude Airship over the US East Coast
Figure 37 - LMCO Large Prototype Image
Figure 38 - NSS Tethered Aerostat
Figure 39 - Early NSS Upper Stage Graphic Showing Nearly Symmetrical Lens Shape
Figure 40 - Current NSS Upper Stage graphic Showing Airfoil Shape, With Lower Stage Inset
Figure 41 - Sanswire-Tao StratelliteTM Platform
Figure 42 - SkySentry Prototype Payload Return System
Figure 43 - SwRI’s CHHAPP Airship Inflated in a Hanger
Figure 44 - SwRI Airship Ascending
Figure 45 - StratXX Airship X-Station 100 Concept
Figure 46 - Probable Early Commercial Mission Markets for Persistent Platforms
Figure 47 - Forecasted Worldwide Cell Phone Subscriptions [Billions of Subscribers] –
2009–2015
Figure 48 - Fastest Growing Cell Phone Markets – 2006
Figure 49 - Forecasted Cell Phone Subscribers by Region by [Billions of Subscribers] –
2009-2015
Figure 50 - Forecasted Cell Phone Infrastructure Spending [$Billion] – 2009-2015
Figure 51 - Military Missions Likely to Shift to Persistent Platforms
Figure 52 - US DoD UAS Annual Funding Profile
Figure 53 - US Military Fixed-Wing UAS – Forecasted Market by [$Billion] – 2009-2015
Figure 54 - US Military Persistent Platform – Forecasted Market by [$Billion] – 2009–2015
Figure 55 - Counter IED – Forecasted Markets by Function [$Billion] – 2009-2015
Figure 56 - US Missile Defense Agency – Forecasted Budget [$Billion] – 2009-2015
Figure 57 - Aerial Photograph from Actual Law Enforcement Operation
Figure 58 - Tracking Mission (RFID) – Forecasted Market [$Billion] – 2009-2015
Figure 59 - European Cell Customers Forecast – Low-Speed vs. High-Speed [Millions
of Subscribers] – 2009-2015
Figure 60 - US Cell Customers Forecast – Low-Speed vs. High-Speed by [Millions of
Subscribers] – 2009-2015
Figure 61 - Estimated Populations in 2000 and 20030 by [Million]
Figure 62 - African Cell Customers Forecast – Low-Speed vs. High-Speed [Millions of
Subscribers] – 2009-2015
Figure 63 - Chinese Cell Customers Forecast – Low-Speed vs. High-Speed [Millions of
Subscribers] – 2009-2015
Figure 64 - Indian Cell Customers Forecast – Low-Speed vs. High-Speed [Millions of
Subscribers] – 2009-2015
Figure 65 - Direct Broadcast Entertainment – Forecasted Market [$Billion] – 2009-2015
Figure 66 - US Combined Remote Sensing – Forecasted Market [$Billion] – 2009, 2012 and 2015
Figure 67 - Japanese Prototype Unmanned Airship
Figure 68 - High Altitude Airship “Berkut” Flight Vehicle
Figure 69 - High Altitude Airship “Berkut” Projected Radio Coverage
Figure 70 - Forecast Saudi Arabian Homeland Security Outlay Forecast by [$Billion] – 2008–2018
Figure 71 - South Korean Prototype Unmanned Airship
Figure 72 - 18,000m3 X-Station at Zeppelin Hangar in Friedrichshafen, Germany

Global Government & Private Sector HLS-HLD Budget [$Billion] Outlook:2009-2018

In over 350 pages, 220 tables and figures, the new “Global Homeland Security, Homeland Defense & Intelligence Markets Outlook 2009-2018” report reviews trends, technologies, business opportunities, sectors and markets, and concludes that the lion share of this growth will be financed by an ever-growing redirection of non terror related national security budgets toward the HLS-HLD and counter terror intelligence sectors.

Global HLS-HLD Market Sectors Growth Rate 2009- 2018 vs. Cumulative Markets

Click here to see related report.

What do roadside bombs have to do with an economic downturn? If you think the answer is “nothing” think again.

An economic downturn will surely have a negative impact on economically weak populations in developing countries, such as Pakistan, India, China, Philippines, and many African and north African countries. Less economic activity means less economic opportunity which translates into less employment and less potential to extract oneself from the choke of poverty. Unemployment means more time to simmer in disappointment, more time and opportunity for “anger” based ideologies to work their way along the fault lines of resentment and despair.

This is the bedrock that produces terrorists and suicide bombers.

Who will most of the newly dispossessed blame for their woes? You can bet on it that the culprit(s) will be America, and the West, with their perceived unbounded greed and purported lack of consideration for anybody else in the world.

What would the most probable weapon of attack be? Most likely it will be suicide bombings and improvised explosive devices (IEDs), not the kind that are deployed along roadsides in Iraq and Afghanistan, but the kind that are hidden in cars and trucks and detonated in garages or in front of selected targets. These weapons and tactics have proven themselves to be the best asymmetric tool of vengeance and terror, Except this time the “theatre of operations” will not be Afghanistan or Iraq; it will likely be Pakistan, China, India and quite likely Western Europe and even the U.S.

Add to this the possibility that the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan will simmer down in the coming year or two; that will create a “surplus” of hundreds of IED experts from all over the middle east, unable to go back to their countries of origin, since they will be hunted by their security services, and unable to stay in their current battleground. Where will they go? My bet is that at least some of them will try to go West. The results will be tragic.

Sounds a little plausible? So what do we do about it? Don’t count on existing technologies to save the day. Most of the technologies developed so far to counter IEDs and suicide bombers will not deploy successfully in a Western urban environment. Cell phone jammers may be good in Baghdad; they will be no good in London or New York. Ditto for armed vehicles and many other detection, mitigation and protection technologies. And as far as counter strategy other than technology, that just does not exist now, so there is nothing to count on.

Policy makers are shaking in their well polished boots at the thought of having to deal with such a scenario, so many of them are still at the “It will not happen to us” and “We have plent of time” stage. That’s a great pity, because by the time they will start internalizing the threat, it will have been too late to formulate a coherent counter strategy, and it will be expensive and ineffectual improvisation time again.

Looking for a strictly technological solution is a waste of time and resources. Some technologies, such as “Backtracking” offer partial promise; they involve persistent high altitude vehicles, sophisticated payloads, and even more sophisticated intelligence infrastructure, but mostly, they require innovative thinking and a radical change in attitude and direction. This time around, it will pay to start working at the strategic level, trying to bring together technological and intelligence components, along with a serious attempt to understand, communicate and negotiate with our adversaries using a whole new toolbox of conflict management/resolution methodologies – the kind that actually works on the ground, not in the limited imagination of Western academics; the kind that understands that the concepts of honor, shame, and insult are meaningful and powerful and should be paid attention to, not just at the lip service level.

In short, it is time for unconventional thinking by unconventional people, looking for unconventional solutions, otherwise, the West and with it many developing countries might find themselves fighting an adversary that they do not understand, with the wrong tools, at a terrible cost to all.

* Doron Pely is Vice President with Homeland Security Research Corporation (HSRC), and lead author of a recent Global Counter-IED Markets and Technologies Report. Doron has also an MA in Dispute Resolution from UMASS Boston.